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The 321st MNC (Fwd) at KKMC stated that DCUs were a priority item for shipment to the Corps. DCUs arriin SWA were transported by truck to Corps supply activities.
In the interest of time, most shipments were sent without any paperwork accompanying the trucks. 1
Command interest, intensive management, and uniform distribution continued until most troops redeployed home.
As late as April, general officer guidance was still being disseminated to ensure soldiers boarding homeward bound aircraft had complete uniforms. The 321st MMC also established operations at the 988th's site to provide theater level management of the parts.
Competition and Multiple Requisitions
As the probability of ground combat increased, the dramatic rise in demands for repair parts caused a number of problems. On numerous occasions the various levels of parts chasers ended up at the same place looking for the the same parts. On some occasions all parties were successful in obtaining their parts and showing up only to find out there were two other engines or transmissions for the same vehicle.M& In other cases, requirements were overstated. 1st COSCOM's After Action Report also succinctly addressed this problem:
Since there so many sources of supply, there were multiple requisitions in the system for the same 13 requirement (sometimes from the same organization)
• . . There were so many requisitions with excessive quantities that the NICP started to cancel them indiscriminately. The MMC was not always notified of the cancellations; this caused a management problem.
Although some high quantities were justified (M915 engines), most were legitimate concerns by the NICP.00
The Materiel Management Centers, in response to the National Inventory Control Points, began screening -and cancelling -both requisitions with potentially excessive quantities and multiple requests for the same item (from the same unit). Automated reports were used to identify possible violators, and commanders were asked to justify questionable requisitions. Those not justified were cancelled. The MMCs were only partially successful and supplies some were shipped, arrived unexpectedly at the wrong support units and became frustrated:
It became a vicious cycle as units generated multiple requisitions for the same requirements and materiel arrived at Supply Support Activities (SSAs) which no longer supported the unit for which the materiel was destined.O3
Centralized Management at King Khalid Military City (KKMC)
In January, theater level centralized management of repair parts was established at Log Base Bravo near KKMC. The 988th was the focal point, providing 24-hour to customers. The repair parts company used manual stock record accounts to record transactions;
and updated the 321st MMC's automated data base after the fact.
Several shortfalls, including theater-wide frustration with the automated system, resulted in growing use of manual procedures:
Intensive management of Class IX major assemblies was most effective when managed offline. The echelon above corps repair parts company operated manually, ARCENT centrally managed distribution, and transportation requirements were frequently identified spontaneously. Most requests were extremely time sensitive and automated SAILS could not have been modified quickly or frequently enough to be responsive.0'4
The 22 SUPCOM provided a team to examine customer requests, monitor asset availability, and establish priority of issue when conflicts arose.
AMC's Army Support Group provided personnel to assist with daily reparable major assembly retrograde operations.
Both corps materiel management centers sent customer assistance teams to the 321st MMC's forward site at KKMC to: handle request from major subordinate commands; coordinate asset redistribution between the corps; and monitor unserviceable and excess parts retrograde. Finally, a second aerial port of debarkation was established at KKMC to expedite the forward movement of supplies and parts.
Major assemblies were the automotive repair parts receiving the most intensive management. Units were required "to provide DA . to input data into the system. The pre-screen acknowledged receipt of the input; searched its lists of NSN's for a match; and signaled a printer at the SARRF to generate a materiel release order that routed the item to a repair or storage activity.00
This system gave LTC Duarte's personnel disposition instructions in less than a minute, whereas the Army's field returns system takes from two to six months.
As unit departures began, late arriving ALOC pallets, frustrated containers, and unit excesses were forwarded to the SARRF. LTC Duarte reported, **It was not unusual for 50 to 100 trucks with both serviceable and unserviceable materiel to show up in a day.a 7 The SARRF remained operational until December 1991. Force modernization initiatives (HMMWV fielding, HENMT fielding, Bradley and MIAI Tank upgrade) caused massive quantities of equipment to arrive in theater not shipped to a consignee.
Quantities involved were at times unclear; assets arrived at both ports; secure facilities were unavailable; and basis of issue plans (BOIPs) were absent.B 3
As a result, units charged with distributing these vehicles were frequently not aware that the assets were in the country! Once notified, they were forced to: o locate and assume accountability for assets often spread throughout crowded port facilities; o ensure pilferage and stripping (unauthorized removal of parts) did not occur; o quickly prepare, then issue, vehicles according to basis of issue plans.
In coordination with the ARCENT J-4, the responsibility for the Once the vehicles were offloaded, the detachment conducted serial number inventories to establish accountability, and used a computerized spreadsheet (developed by one of the noncommissioned officers) to maintain asset visibility. Independent searches were initiated to obtain visibility and accountability for misrouted or abandoned vehicles. When theft or unauthorized cannibalization was evident, criminal investigators were notified and formal investigations were conducted.
This system relied heavily on the detachment's resourcefulness and ability to operate independently, and the theater benefit- In an era of diminishing resources, maintaining logistics momentum and flexibility will become more critical to operational success. Every effort must be made to minimize the costs of support operations.
It is highly unlikely that the "brute force logistics" (a phrase used by LTG Frederick
Franks, CDR, VII Corps) 3 e available for Desert Storm will be available in future conflicts. What must be available are the hallmarks of logistics support --momentum and flexibility.
Then, and only then, will logistics be a combat multiplier.
